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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship between numbers of topic-specific board meetings and 
quality of corporate governance. The quality of corporate governance is estimated by CEO 
turnover-performance and compensation-performance sensitivities. Information about topic-
specific meetings is collected from the reports of independent directors of Chinese listed 
firms. We find that more-frequent discussions of growth strategies related to the use of IPO 
proceeds, investment and acquisitions increase CEO compensation-performance sensitivity. 
By contrast, more discussions about the nomination of directors and top management are 
likely to reduce the sensitivities of both CEO turnover and compensation to performance. Our 
findings shed light on what makes boards efficient, and how board monitoring of assorted 
decisions modifies the relationship between CEO interests and firm performance.  
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G30; G34 
Keywords: Board Effectiveness, Board Meeting Topics, CEO Dismissal, CEO Compensation, 
China 
 
 
 
Note: Standard disclaimer applied. Corresponding author: Jiao Ji (jiao.ji@sheffield.ac.uk).  
 
 
 
1 
  
1. Introduction 
Board meetings, possibly the most directly observed board activity, are often advocated by 
the public and regulators as a way to enhance board effectiveness in public companies. 
Regulators (e.g., in the US, UK, India and China) often require listed companies to hold a 
minimum number of meetings every year. However, a high number of meetings does not 
necessarily suggest board functions well, owing to the fact that the topics of board meetings 
are diverse. At board meetings, various proposals (e.g., business strategy, risk oversight, CEO 
succession planning) are discussed by the directors. It is not the number of board meetings 
that indicates board’s efforts in monitoring, but the ratification and monitoring of corporate 
proposals in board meetings, which help boards to monitor and assess CEOs (e.g. Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).   
 The monitoring of assorted types of proposals provides boards with channels for 
evaluating CEO and corporate performance. Boards of directors often have limited access to 
firm information (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Jensen, 1993). At board meetings, they 
rely on the supplementary information in proposals to make decisions. This means that most 
additional information acquired by boards is proposal-based. The amount, range and 
complexity of the information largely influence board performance (e.g. Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005). Board activities related to major proposals enhance the work 
efficiency of the directors as a group, as they involve exchanging information and interacting 
with each other (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Forbes and Milliken (1999). Thus, board activities 
related to various proposals represent board supervisory effectiveness in corresponding 
dimensions. 
 Boards of directors play a major role in mitigating agency problems associated with the 
separation between ownership and control (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976). Without boards’ monitoring, management teams are more likely to take 
self-benefitting actions, and deviate from the interests of residual claimants. Agency models 
prescribe normative actions such that compensation is related to effort and performance, and 
boards fire poorly performing CEOs. CEO dismissal and compensation are the most 
important decisions made by boards of directors (Adams et al., 2010; Hermalin, 2005; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Therefore, the efficiency of these decisions indicates the 
effectiveness of the board’s supervisory role in monitoring the CEO, and represents the 
quality of governance.  
 Our study provides new evidence of board effectiveness by looking into the black box of 
board meetings via various supovisory activities. We use number and types of meetings to 
proxy for board supervisory activities on assorted proposals. The CEO dismissal-performance 
relationship and compensation-performance relationship are used as proxies for quality of 
corporate governance, as widely applied in previous literature (e.g., Adams et al., 2010; 
Gibson, 2003; Kato and Long, 2006a). We investigate the relationship between numbers of 
topic-specific board meetings and quality of corporate governance. 
 Observing board monitoring of different types of proposals is not straightforward, due to 
data confidentiality. Almost two decades ago, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) introduced an innovative practice whereby independent directors were obliged to 
issue Report[s] of the Independent Director after board meetings. 1  The reports publicly 
disclose topics discussed at meetings and the opinions of the independent directors on these 
topics. This represents a novel approach to enriching corporate disclosure and board 
accountability in the decision-making process. From these reports, we are able to capture 
task-based board activities on six major topics, explicitly, personnel changes, compensation, 
1 The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China in 2001 and 2002. 
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financial reports and audit, firm control transactions, changes of equity structure, and growth 
strategies. 
 In China (as in many other emerging markets), the legal protection of investor rights and 
accounting standards are less developed than in Western countries. Evidence on CEO 
dismissal/compensation and firm performance based on Chinese data is less common, and the 
concrete factors of CEO contracting are yet to be established conclusively. Within the limited 
studies that do exist, the results are mixed (e.g., Conyon and He, 2012, 2014). Empirical 
studies focusing on board effectiveness in China often utilize the proportion of independent 
directors on the board or annual board meeting frequency as proxies for board monitoring. 
They document mixed results on whether increasing board monitoring benefits corporate 
governance (Peng, 2004; Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui, 2006; Kato and Long, 2006a; Liu et al., 
2015).  
 Our study focuses on the topics boards discuss during meetings, and provides new 
evidence on board effectiveness in China. We apply panel data techniques to explore the 
moderating effects of specific topics discussed at board meetings, on the sensitivity of CEO 
dismissal/compensation to performance. Furthermore, we extend our analysis with dynamic 
generalized method of moments (GMM) regressions to mitigate possible endogeneity issues. 
Our key findings show that CEO dismissal and compensation are related to firm performance 
in China, suggesting that the corporate governance mechanism is effective in contracting and 
monitoring executives. Pay-performance sensitivity is strengthened by additional board 
monitoring efforts involving discussions of firms’ growth strategies (i.e. investments and 
acquisitions). In contrast, the relationships between CEO dismissal/pay and firm performance 
are weaker when there are more board activities on the nominations of directors and top 
management.  
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  We also investigate whether effects of board activities vary under different ownership 
structures. The majority of China’s listed firms are controlled by either state shareholders or 
non-state shareholders (explicitly, private firms or individuals). State shareholders have 
political and economic considerations, while non-state shareholders s are mainly profit-driven 
(Allen et al, 2005; Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui, 2006). Under different ownership structures, 
the controlling shareholders have different primary motives, which lead to different 
influences on managers. This could instigate distinctive effects of topic-specific meetings on 
quality of corporate governance. We find that the negative moderation effect of nomination 
meetings on the relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance is significant in 
non-state-controlled firms, yet there is no effect in state-controlled firms. Further, the 
moderation effect of growth-strategy meetings on the CEO-pay-to-performance sensitivity is 
positive in both non-state-controlled and state-controlled firms. 
 Our research contributes to the corporate governance literature in the following ways. First, 
it is related to the literature that examines board effectiveness and influence upon firm 
performance. Previous studies (e.g., Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010; Schwartz-Ziv 
and Weisbach, 2013) in the field of board effectiveness have only focused on board 
characteristics, and drawn inferences about how board characteristics could affect their 
activities, and ultimately impact firm value. To our best knowledge, our study is the first to 
conduct systematic research of whether board activities on assorted topics affect the quality 
of corporate governance. We show that board activities related to strategic decisions can alter 
the relationship between CEO interests and firm performance.  
 Second, our study contributes to the dynamic debate among academics and practitioners 
on the importance of board meetings. This study provides novel empirical evidence on how 
boards’ task performance links with governance at the firm level. Consistent with the 
prediction of the board process model (e.g., Forbes and Milliken, 1999) that board task 
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performance can improve corporate governance, we find that meetings on growth strategies 
have positive effects on corporate governance, although meetings with assorted emphases 
have different effects. Given that previous studies (e.g., Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; 
Vafeas, 1999) only take annual meeting frequency into account, we argue that our proxies for 
board monitoring activities are more accurate. 
 Finally, our study provides the first large-sample evidence of board monitoring activities 
improving corporate governance. Previous studies (Jiang, Wan, and Zhao, 2016; Ma and 
Khanna, 2016; Tang, Du, and Hou, 2013), also employing data from independent director 
reports, focus on how independent directors improve governance via dissension reports. They 
investigate the effect of dissension on the stock market, and explore which factors increase 
the probability of dissenting votes from independent directors. However, the dissensions only 
account for less than 2% of all reports. Our results using all the data specify that the various 
monitoring activities conducted in the board room have different effects on the sensitivities of 
CEO dismissal/compensation to performance. This lends support to the idea that 
(independent) board governance can offset the power of CEOs and controlling shareholders 
in China. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide the institutional 
background and literature review. The Sections 3 and 4 describe the sample data and explain 
our research design. The penultimate section contains the empirical results and discussion. In 
the final section, we present our conclusions and discuss areas for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Institutional Background and Corporate Governance in China 
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 China’s economic reform began with the study of the modern corporate governance 
systems of Western countries. In 1992, China introduced Germany’s two-tier board system, 
consisting of the main board and a supervisory board. In most stated-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the government had a significant impact on the nominations and appointments to 
both boards. The top management of firms worked as bureaucrats, and the supervisory boards 
had little motivation and ambiguous accountability when it came to monitoring managers and 
firm operations (Allen et al., 2005; Conyon and He, 2011).  
 In order to deepen the economic reforms and protect the interests of minority shareholders, 
the CSRC mimicked the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in adopting new corporate governance 
mechanisms from 2001 onwards. It issued guidelines and regulations (2001, 2002) that 
compelled each listed firm to have independent directors on its main board and to improve 
the quality of its information disclosure. The proportion of independent directors was 
required to be at least one-third by June 2003, while independent directors were required to 
publish the Report of the Independent Director after board meetings (CSRC, 2001). As a 
result, the protection of public shareholder interests and the transparency of information 
disclosure have improved (CSRC, 2004).  
 In 2005, the independent directors’ system gained legal status for the first time, when it 
was authorized in the new Company Law of China (2005). Independent directors, as a group 
of corporate agents, are not affiliated with the listed firm or the controlling shareholders, and, 
as was set out, ‘shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders from being infringed’ (CSRC, 2002). Furthermore, independent directors are 
legally liable for disclosing fraud and irregularities of listed firms through the Report of the 
Independent Directors The report must state whether  independent directors agrees with 
important managerial proposals discussed at the board meeting. Specifically, it is mandatory 
that votes on firm decisions are revealed (CSRC, 2001).  
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 These reports provide a unique dataset from China allowing us to study corporate boards 
that typically function inside black boxes. Recent studies (Jiang et al., 2016; Tang et al., 2013) 
show that independent directors’ dissensions in board meetings are a valid signal of the 
presence of effective corporate governance. Tang et al. (2013) find that the stock market has 
a negative reaction to the announcements of independent reports referring to dissenting votes. 
The probability of receiving a negative report is higher for firms with more serious agency 
problems. Jiang et al. (2016) show that independent directors who have higher human capital 
concerns are more likely to give negative opinions in their reports, and the directors issuing 
dissensions are rewarded by more directorships and lowers the likelihood of regulatory 
sanctions. These studies suggest that directors’ dissenting votes enhance corporate 
governance and market transparency primarily through the responses of stakeholders to the 
information released about dissenting votes.  
 However, the dissenting reports account for merely 1.31% of all the reports in the dataset 
from 2005 to 2010 (Tang et al., 2013), and less than 2% from 2005 to 2015 based on our 
sample. In fact, the low rate of dissent is not unique to China. Director dissensions are rarely 
observed worldwide (e.g., approximate 2% from board meeting minutes in ten Israel firms 
over three years) (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013). In addition, studies focusing on the 
dissenting votes ignore directors’ role in corporate governance in ‘normal’ situations.  
 By fully utilizing the data from all the independent directors’ reports, we extract proposal-
based board monitoring activities, explicitly, topic-specific meeting frequencies. Thus, we 
provide systematic, large-sample empirical work, examining whether and how board 
monitoring based on particular topics enhances quality of corporate governance. This 
highlights the role of the board of directors in modifying the relationship between CEO 
interests and firm performance in day-to-day supervision.  
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 2.2 CEO Dismissal and Compensation, Firm Performance and Boards of Directors in China 
 
 The board is responsible for designing a compensation contract that will motivate the CEO, 
rewarding acceptable firm performance, and punishing (and in extreme cases, dismissing) the 
CEO for poor performance (Fama, 1980). Worldwide (but heavily focused on the US market), 
research on the subject has mostly been restricted to investigating how board composition 
and features influence the relationships between CEO rewards and firm performance. These 
characteristics include independent director composition (Dah, Frye, and Hurst, 2014), board 
size (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008), CEO-chairman duality (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), 
board gender or ethnic diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter, 2010), directors’ 
reputation (e.g., Shivdasani, 1993), and the working backgrounds of board members (e.g., 
Francis, Hasan, and Wu, 2015). 
 The limited empirical literature based on the Chinese market shows mixed results on 
drivers of CEO dismissal and compensation. The statistical significance and magnitude of the 
coefficients linking CEO dismissal/compensation to performance vary, depending on 
performance measures and sample periods (e.g., Bai and Xu, 2005; Conyon and He, 2011, 
2014; Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006; Kato and Long, 2006b). For instance, CEO turnover is 
more likely to be associated with accounting performance, and less with market-based 
performance (Conyon and He, 2014). Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007), using data from 1998 to 
2000, find that CEO compensation in China is more likely to be connected to firm accounting 
performance (i.e. return on assets, ROA) than market performance. 
Research using data on China’s listed firms documents mixed results on the influence of 
independent directors on top executive turnover/compensation. Kato and Long (2006) find 
that the presence of independent directors enhances the turnover-performance relation from 
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1999 to 2002. Conyon and He (2011) argue that non-state (privately) controlled firms, and 
firms with more independent directors on the board, are more likely to replace their CEO due 
to poor performance, based on data from 2001 to 2005. In contrast, Firth, Fung, and Rui 
(2006) show that the turnover-performance sensitivity is lower if more independent directors 
are on the board. Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007) show firms with more non-executive directors 
are more likely to use performance-based pay, and firms that have a joint CEO/chairman 
position are less likely to use performance-based pay. Conyon and He (2011) find that firms 
with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link, for 
data from 2001 to 2005.  
The Chinese corporate governance framework has several features that may not exist in 
Western economies. Due to historical reasons, many firms are still controlled or influenced 
by the state. Profitability is not the only goal of the state owners. Directors in state-controlled 
firms are representatives of the state, or state agents, and they may be more concerned about 
their political careers than the professional managerial market (Wang, 2015). Thus, non-
profit goals are often what state-controlled shareholders pursue, but this is against minority 
shareholders’ interests (Allen et al., 2005). As a result, independent directors do not dismiss 
CEOs of poorly performing firms (Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006). In non-state-controlled firms, 
managers are often the controlling shareholders themselves or strongly aligned with the 
controlling shareholders. It is more challenging for such boards to discipline the entrenched 
managers. The effectiveness of board monitoring is likely to differ between state-controlled 
and non-state-controlled firms. 
 
 
2.3 Topic-Specific Board Meetings and Corporate Governance in China 
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 Directors (especially independent directors) are not full-time employees of the companies 
they serve. Board meetings offer directors more time to carry out their monitoring functions. 
Interactions and communications during meetings provide directors with more information 
about the firm (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). The meeting time also has the salutary effect of 
strengthening the cohesive bonds among directors (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). From this 
point of view, the more frequent the meetings, the better are the monitoring and control, 
resulting in better corporate governance outcomes. However, Jensen (1993) points out that 
too many inefficient and routine meetings are held primarily to satisfy the requirements of 
firm hierarchy and regulation, which is the main critique of the meaningfulness of board 
activities.  
 Previous studies on board meetings most often portray them (Adams, 2005; Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999) as rather homogeneous and monolithic. Vafeas (1999) 
finds that poor performance increases the frequency of board meetings, while the number of 
board meetings has no effect on CEO turnover/performance sensitivity in the US market. 
However, more board meetings and higher meeting attendances do not effectively prevent the 
management from engaging in opportunistic behaviours (e.g., Lo, Wong, and Firth, 2010). 
 Topic-specific meetings provide directors with corporate information on various 
dimensions, which are fundamental to board decisions. Meeting frequencies on assorted 
important topics are also effective measures of how directors fulfil their monitoring 
obligations, because boards of directors put most of their effort into monitoring sundry 
management decisions (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013; Stiles, 2001). For example, board 
meetings on accounting practice and reporting requirements can directly reveal managerial 
malfeasance (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Meetings on hiring, firing and assessment of top 
management and directors disclose the bargaining that goes on between CEOs and boards of 
directors (e.g., Adams et al., 2010).  Furthermore, meetings on the selection of projects and 
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strategy provide boards with insights into CEO types (good or bad) based on the NPVs of the 
CEO’s projects (Dominguez-Martinez, Swank, and Visser, 2008). 
 We hypothesize that, if the board of directors works effectively in China, the meeting 
frequency on certain topics could enhance the relationship between CEO turnover (or 
compensation) and firm performance. In contrast, if the sensitivities between CEO interests 
and firm performance are not altered by the number of meetings on any topics, it may suggest 
that board monitoring at such meetings is not effective. Our study provides evidence on how 
topic-specific board meetings directly affect the quality of corporate governance in China.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
 We perform our analysis on a sample of firms listed on the Main Boards of the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over the period of 2005-2015. Financial and corporate 
governance information is obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. A number of screening procedures are applied to our original sample. 
First, we exclude financial firms because of their special regulations and accounting 
standards. Second, we only retain those firms with at least three consecutive fiscal years of 
capital market and financial statement data. Third, to alleviate the influence of extreme values, 
all firm-level financial data are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. We end up with 14,359 
firm-year observations after applying this selection process. 
 The public release of the Report of the Independent Director, from which our measures of 
topic-specific meetings are collected, began in 2001 and became ‘compulsory’ in 2003. 
During 2003-2005, reports were only issued by listed firms on a ‘voluntary’ basis, as the 
CSRC requirements for issuing such reports were unclear. The Information Disclosure 
Standards (CSRC, 2005) further clarified the disclosure requirements. After 2005, the 
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number of independent directors’ reports increased sharply. For each report, the CSMAR 
records the firm’s stock code, the issuing date, the topics discussed, the independent directors’ 
opinions, and the entire contents of the report (see Appendix A for an example of an 
independent directors’ report). Reports contain various combinations of topics, in accordance 
with the topic[s] discussed at the board meeting in question. We use the frequency with 
which a topic is discussed at board meetings over a year as a proxy for board monitoring 
activity on the particular topic. 
 Column 1 of Table 1 reports mandatory disclosure subjects in the independent directors’ 
reports recorded in the CSMAR database. Based on the content and roles of these topics in 
corporate governance, we group them into six major topics, as in Column 2 of Table 1, 
namely Nomination (A), Compensation (B), Financial reports and audit (C), Corporate 
control transactions (D), Change of equity structure (E) and Growth strategies (F). Tang et al. 
(2013) use a similar categorization of topics.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.1 Types of Board Meetings 
 
 Nomination. A role typically associated with the board of directors is control of the 
process by which top executives are hired, promoted, assessed and, if necessary, dismissed. 
Nomination decisions of board members and top management may also reflect the power 
2 We also used eleven topics in robustness tests. Our main results were unchanged and are available upon 
request. 
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dynamics between the CEO and board. If the board is weak, the CEO turnover and salary 
might not be significantly related to firm performance (Boyd, 1994; Weisbach, 1988). 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that board monitoring is reduced if the selection of 
directors is not independent from the CEO. 
 Compensation. The board is also responsible for keeping the levels of remuneration 
sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors. Empirical studies in China often state a 
weak association between CEO compensation and firm performance (e.g., Firth et al., 2006a). 
Although boards of directors are supposed to monitor the excess compensation of executives, 
they hardly ever confront management except when it comes to firing them. Brick, Palmon, 
and Wald (2006) find that director pay is positively related to CEO pay. They also find 
evidence that excess compensation (for both directors and CEO) is associated with firm 
underperformance, indicating mutual back scratching or cronyism among the CEO and 
directors.  
 Financial report and audit, and corporate control transactions. Boards of directors are 
also responsible for overseeing internal control, approval of financial statements, and 
reporting to the shareholders. The “financial reports and audit” meetings include meetings on 
issuing/amending annual reports, auditors’ reports and auditor changes. “Corporate control 
transactions” involve related-party transactions, loan guarantees and the disposal of assets. 
These transactions may be associated with a manager’s or a controlling shareholder’s 
“tunnelling or propping” behaviour, which can harm shareholders’ interests (e.g., Peng, Wei, 
and Yang, 2011). Board meetings on these topics assist the board with fulfilling their 
disciplinary role, which reduces the probability of financial fraud and managers’ tunnelling 
behaviour.  
 Growth strategies. Setting the strategic direction of the company is another role the board 
serves (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). Meetings on growth strategies enable boards of directors 
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to re-evaluate CEO capability and firm fundamentals. The board makes decisions on issues 
that are critical and strategic, such as acquiring a new firm, divesting a division or negotiating 
a takeover bid (Baysinger and Bulter, 1985; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Minichilli et al., 2009). 
Meetings on growth strategies include the use of IPO proceeds, investments and acquisitions, 
and financing.   
 Change of equity structure. Our sample period coincides with the split share structure 
reform in China. Prior to 2005, listed firms in China were characterized by a split share 
structure, in which two-thirds of the state-owned shares were not tradable. These non-
tradable shares were largely blamed for some serious corporate governance issues and a lack 
of incentives for managers under the state-ownership structure. In April 2005, the CSRC 
initiated a split share structure reform, which enabled state shareholders of listed firms to 
trade their restricted shares. Board meeting decisions related to a split share structure reform 
influence a firm’s ownership structure could eventually cause a change in the firm’s internal 
corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., Cao, Pan, and Tian, 2011).  
 Table 2 presents the sample distribution and descriptive statistics for six types of meetings, 
across industries. Generally, the meeting frequencies of the six topics are steady across 
industries. Accommodation and Catering (H) and Culture and Sports and Entertainment (M) 
tend to have slight more meetings than other industries, but account for just 1.9% of the 
sample. 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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3.2 Key Variables 
 
 CEO dismissal. The top executive in a Chinese listed firm is often the chairman (or 
general manager) of the board. She/he is the legal representative of the firm, works full time, 
and is involved in the firm’s daily decision making (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011; Kato and 
Long, 2006a). Consistent with previous studies, we adopt the title of CEO for the top 
executive, to avoid confusion. CEO dismissal is coded as a dichotomous variable, which 
equals one if a CEO is forcefully dismissed, and zero otherwise. In line with previous studies 
(e.g., Chang and Wong, 2009; You and Du, 2012), we exclude voluntary turnover because of 
health issues or retirement, based on public information (recorded in the CSMAR dataset), 
retaining only the forced dismissals.  
 Panel A of Table 3 exhibits the yearly distribution for CEO dismissal. During our sample 
period, we identify 2,556 forced CEO dismissals among the 14,359 firm-year observations. If 
a firm has two or more dismissalsin one fiscal year, we merely count the last one. The 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover is approximately 18%, implying an average CEO tenure 
of less than five years, which is consistent with the findings of Conyon and He (2014) and 
similar to the turnover rate in the US (Kaplan and Minton, 2012).  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Compensation. Executive compensation schemes in China typically embrace three 
components: cash salaries, bonuses, and stipends. Although the CSRC has permitted stock 
option trading since 2005, their adoption in equity compensation is rare: only 1.5% of CEOs 
received equity grants in 2005, a figure that climbed to 3.5% in 2010 (Conyon and He, 2012). 
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Empirical studies estimate that Chinese executives may receive ‘perks’ from their companies, 
accounting for approximately 15-32% of total compensation, but they are rarely disclosed in 
financial reports and difficult to assess using public data. Hence, compensation in this study 
is the reported sum of cash salaries, bonuses, and stipends. Compensation is measured as the 
average compensation of the three highest-paid management executives and directors in a 
firm, consistent with prior research (e.g., Conyon and He, 2012). 
 Panel A of Table 3 illustrates that executive compensation has risen rapidly. The amount 
paid in 2015, about 802,000 RMB (116,500 USD), was triple that in 2005 (230,000 RMB / 
33,400 USD). Although executive compensation is not as high as that in the US, it is ten 
times the average wage of employees in the same industry, according to data from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. The logarithm of executive compensation is included 
in our regressions. Chinese listed firms probably set up their compensation contracts using 
industry benchmarks (Jiang, Liao, Lin, and Liu, 2018). In our regressions, we use Industry-
adjusted compensation as a proxy for excess compensation, which is defined as the firm’s 
compensation minus the average compensation in the same industry, based on the CSRC 
industry code, in the given fiscal year. The untabulated results obtained by using raw 
compensation are similar. 
 
 Topic-specific meetings. Panel B of Table 3 details the descriptive statistics and annual 
meeting frequencies for each specific topic. Although the annual number of meetings does 
not change much (about eight or ten meetings per year, see last row of Panel A-Table 3), the 
topics discussed at the meetings show significant variation. Since 2005, proposals of firm 
control transactions (e.g., related-party transactions) have been the most frequently discussed 
topic, at 1.74 times per firm-year. The nomination of directors and executives is the second 
most frequent, occurring about once per firm-year. The number of meetings about 
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compensation changes increases from 96 in 2005 to 915 in 2015, which is in line with the 
rapid increase in executive compensation over that period. The average meeting frequencies 
for the topics of financial reports and audit and growth strategies are 0.42 and 0.35, 
respectively. The frequency of meetings on changes in equity structure is likely influenced by 
government policy. In 2005, the CSRC instigated the split share structure reform, setting a 
deadline for the end of 2006. As most of the equity structure changes were related to non-
tradable shares, mostly owned by SOEs or government agencies, being transformed into 
tradable shares, the frequency of meetings on equity structure changes peaked at 1,055 in the 
year 2006.  
 Panel C of Table 3 shows how meeting frequencies vary with firm size. Board 
characteristics and monitoring activities may differ based on organizational complexity; one 
such characteristic is firm size (Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998; Vafeas, 1999). Thus, 
we divide firm-year observations into three groups based on corporate book value: small 
firms (the lower third of the distribution), median firms (the median third) and large firms 
(the higher third). Among the six topics of meetings, frequencies for four topics increase with 
firm size: nomination, compensation, corporate control transactions, and growth strategies. 
Particularly, the number of meetings about corporate control transitions in large firms is 
double that in small firms (t-statistic for the average meeting frequency for corporate control 
transactions in small firms minus that in large firms is significant at the 1% level). Meetings 
about changes in equity structure are most frequent in small firms, meetings to discuss 
financial reports and audits do not alter with firm size. 
 Panel D of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and annual meeting frequencies for 
all eleven topics, based on the CSMAR database. Meetings of related-party transactions (M4) 
and loan guarantees (M5) comprise most of the meetings discussing corporate control 
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transactions. Audit changes (M7), ownership changes (M8) and disposal of assets (M10) are 
not discussed frequently in board meetings in China. 
 Firm performance measures. Our primary measure of firm performance is ROA. Table 4 
shows that the average ROA is about 3.9%, which is consistent with prior research (Conyon 
and He, 2011, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006a). We also use two other accounting performance 
measures, return on equity (ROE) and profit margin (sales profit / sales income), in 
robustness tests. Although market-based performance measures (i.e., stock returns and 
Tobin’s Q) are widely used in developed markets, they are not considered an appropriate 
performance measure for Chinese listed firms. Most Chinese listed firms are SOEs, the 
majority of whose shares are not tradable in the secondary market. The holders of non-
tradable shares, mainly governments or state-owned legal persons, typically acquire their 
shares at prices significantly lower than the initial public offering prices. Since there are big 
pricing gaps between tradable and non-tradable shares, Tobin's Q would not correctly reflect 
firms’ financial performance or value. In addition, the Chinese stock markets are highly 
speculative, and share prices bear little relationship to their fundamental values (e.g., Bai, Liu, 
Lu, Song, and Zhang, 2004). In our regression, we use the industry-adjusted return on assets 
that is the firm’s ROA minus the average ROA in the same industry, following the literature 
(Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999). We also employ firms’ raw ROA in the 
regressions, and the results are unaltered and available upon request. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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 Control variables. Following the recent corporate board literature (Conyon and He, 2011; 
You and Du, 2012), we group the vector of control variables into three categories: board 
features, ownership variables, and firm characteristics. Table 4 presents the descriptive 
statistics for these variables. The category of board feature variables contains the percentage 
of independent directors on a board (Independent directors %), the natural log of the number 
of board directors (Board size), and a dummy variable for whether the CEO also chairs the 
board (Duality). The group of ownership structure variables includes shares held by the 
largest shareholders (Largest shareholding), the Herfindahl index, which is the sum of 
squares of the shareholding percentages of the top five shareholders (Ownership 
concentration), and an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is controlled by a 
parent SOE or government agent (State-owned enterprises). To control for firm 
characteristics, we include the natural log of a firm’s total assets (Log(firm size)), the 
logarithm of the number of employees (Log(employees)), and the book value of debt divided 
by total assets (Leverage). We also control for CEO age (Age) and gender (Female) in the 
estimations of CEO dismissal. A set of year dummies are included to control for macro-
economic shocks, while industry dummies account for industry-specific factors.3  
 About 66% of the listed companies in our sample are SOEs. The average number of board 
members is 9.19 and independent directors make up 37% of them (the legal requirement has 
been one third since 2003). About 14% of firms have a CEO with dual leadership roles. The 
pairwise correlations between the variables are provided in Appendix B. There are only 
modest correlations among the independent variables. The values of the variance inflation 
3 Industry dummies are included because listed firms may change main business sectors during the sample 
period. The untabulated coefficients of the industry dummies prove the existence of within-group variance for 
most industries. 
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factors (VIFs) range from 1.02 to 1.86, and all the values are strictly less than 3, indicating 
that the regression analysis is not likely to have multicollinearity problems. The distributions 
of the other variables are largely consistent with those reported in prior studies. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
 To examine the impact of topic-specific meetings on the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to 
firm performance, we estimate six series of panel data logistic regressions with fixed effects, 
for firm i in year t: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ( 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,   
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  ×  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)    (1) 
 To test the effect of topic-specific meetings on the correlation between compensation and 
performance, we estimate six series of linear regression models using fixed effects:  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,   
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  ×  𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)   (2) 
A fixed effects estimator can help to control the heteroscedasticity caused by unobserved 
firm-specific influences or measuring errors in regressions. In order to examine whether the 
holding of topic-specific meetings has an impact on performance-related CEO dismissal and 
compensation, we include interaction effects of the frequencies of meetings on the six major 
topics, individually. In other words, for each type of meeting, we include  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  and the interaction term 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 in the regression models. The use of interaction 
terms is common in economics and finance research (e.g., Firth et al., 2006; Kato and Long, 
2006b; Weisbach, 1988; You and Du, 2012). A positive value for the effect of the interaction 
term in the compensation models would imply that, the higher was the frequency with which 
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topics were discussed at board meetings, the greater would be the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to performance. In the CEO dismissal models, a negative value for the effect of 
the interaction would indicate that, the more a certain topic was discussed at board meetings, 
the greater would be the CEO dismissal-to-performance sensitivity. To provide robust 
evidence, we alternatively measure meeting frequency using an indicator for each topic, 
topic-specific meeting dummy, which equals one if the meeting frequency is above the 
median of the distribution within the same year, and zero otherwise.  
 We can also partly mitigate the endogeneity issue by using lagged values of all 
independent variables to facilitate causality. Further consideration of endogeneity issues is 
provided in robustness checks where we implement dynamic GMM regressions. 
 
5. Do Topic-Specific Board Meetings Affect Quality of Corporate Governance? 
 
5.1 CEO Dismissal, Firm Performance, and Topic-Specific Board Meetings 
 
 In this section, we examine whether the frequencies of topic-specific board meetings 
affect the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. The dependent variable is set to one if the 
CEO has been dismissed and zero otherwise. Table 5 presents the results of the logistic 
regressions with fixed effects based on equation (1), with firm performance measured using 
industry-adjusted ROA.4 The topic-specific meeting variables for each of the six topics are 
defined as (1) the annual meeting frequency and (2) a topic-specific meeting dummy, 
4 We also estimate equation (1) using random effects and the main results are consistent with those obtained 
using fixed effects. The results of a Hausman test indicate that the firm-fixed-effects models in our study are 
more suitable.  
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indicating whether the annual meeting frequency is above the median for the distribution 
within the same year. Columns (A) to (F) show the estimation results for each board meeting 
topic. For instance, Column (A)–(1) presents the regression results obtained using the number 
of nomination-related meetings, while Column (A)-(2) presents those obtained using the 
topic-specific meeting dummy for nomination-related meetings. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 5 shows that CEO dismissal and firm performance are negatively associated after 
controlling for firm-level governance and characteristics.5 This indicates that the CEO would 
be dismissed by the board if the firm performance was poor, consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Chen, Firth, and Xu, 2009; Conyon and He, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006b).  
 To test and evaluate the effects of topic-specific meetings on turnover-performance 
sensitivity, we introduce two variables, namely 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
and an interaction term, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  ×  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 . 
The coefficients on meeting frequency for Nomination (A), Compensation (B), and Growth 
strategies (F) are negative and statistically significant, which indicates that firms with more 
meetings related to nominations, compensation, or growth strategies have lower likelihoods 
of dismissing their CEOs. In contrast, the coefficients of (C) Financial reports and audit are 
positively significant, which implies that firms with more meetings discussing financial 
reports, auditor switches and changes of audit opinion are more likely to fire their CEOs. The 
5 We use stock returns and Tobin’s Q as performance measures, and find that market performance plays a 
limited role in explaining the probability of CEO dismissal or the size of compensation, which is consistent with 
the finding of Conyon and He (2014). 
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amendment of financial reports and changes of auditor opinion are probably related to poor 
firm performance and corporate governance problems. Meetings on these topics will help 
directors to identify weaknesses in firm performance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), which could 
put more pressure on a firm to fire its CEO. 
 For nomination meetings (A), where boards discuss personnel changes involving directors, 
the CEO, and top management, the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive. 
This result suggests that the existence of board nomination meetings reduces the sensitivity of 
forced CEO dismissal to firm performance. Other board meeting topics are unlikely to affect 
the dismissal-performance relationship. The coefficients of the interaction terms have 
different signs and vary greatly in magnitude, indicating that the influences of different types 
of meetings on CEO-performance sensitivities are different, although most of them are not 
significant. Out of all six major types of meeting topics, we find no monitoring activities that 
increased the negative relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance, suggesting 
that boards of directors in China are not effective at dismissing poorly performing CEOs 
through their monitoring of corporate decisions. Our findings reflect the difficulties boards of 
directors have dismissing their CEOs in China (Allen et al., 2005; Firth, Fung, and Rui, 
2006b). Furthermore, we explore whether the effects of nomination meeting on CEO 
dismissal-performance sensitivity differs under different ownership structures, in Section 5.3. 
 CEO/chairman duality has negative effects on the probability of CEO dismissal, consistent 
with the findings of Goyal and Park (2002). Firms of a larger size have a lower probability of 
forcibly dismissing their CEO. The coefficients of the percentage of independent directors are 
not significant, which is consistent with the findings of Kato and Long (2006a). 
 CEO dismissal may not happen suddenly, but could instead rely on unsatisfactory long-
term performance. Thus, we also explore whether these board meetings (accumulated board 
meetings) have an effect on the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to long-term performance. We 
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estimate a logit model with firm fixed effects of CEO dismissal and long-term performance. 
The latter is defined as the accumulated industry-adjusted ROA from year t-3 to t-1, which is 
then interacted with board meetings in year t-1 for each topic (or with accumulated board 
meetings from year t-3 to t-1) following Kim (1996). The hypothesis examined is that the 
probability of CEO dismissal is significantly more sensitive to long-term performance when 
there are more board meetings. The results (not tabulated) do not support this assertion. The 
evidence suggests that, although CEO dismissal is negatively related to long-term 
performance, (accumulated) board activities do not influence the relation between CEO 
dismissal and long-term performance.  
 Overall, our results imply that different types of board meetings may affect the CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity differently. Interestingly, the existence of board nomination 
meetings lessens the sensitivity of CEO dismissals to performance.  
 
5.2 Compensation, Firm Performance, and Topic-specific Board Meetings 
 
 Table 6A reports panel data estimates from equation (2) with fixed effects in which we 
examine the effects of topic-specific boarding meetings on the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance in China. Columns (A) to (F) represent the estimation 
results for each board meeting topic. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6A about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 6A illustrates that there is a positive relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance, suggesting that a CEO’s pay is generally higher in firms with good 
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performance. Our results coincide with prior research (Conyon and He, 2012; Firth et al., 
2006). The implication is that firm profitability is an important component of CEOs’ 
compensation contracting in the Chinese market. 
 Executive compensation is positively related to meeting frequencies on the topics of 
Nomination (A) and Compensation (B). This implies these meetings are likely to be used by 
CEOs to increase their compensation level, while the boards of directors do not seem able to 
challenge their CEOs’ demands for high payments at meetings. As for the interaction terms, 
the coefficient of ROA interacted with the frequency of meetings on growth strategy is 
positive and significant. This means the CEO pay-performance sensitivity is higher when a 
firm has more meetings on growth strategies, which is consistent with our conjectures about 
the role of growth-strategy meetings. Meetings on growth strategies enable boards of 
directors to re-evaluate CEO capability and firm fundamentals deeply, and reward CEO 
efforts towards enhancing firm performance (Dominguez-Martinez, Swank, and Visser, 
2008). Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term between nomination meeting 
frequency and ROA is significantly negative, which suggests that the link between executive 
compensation and a firm’s performance is likely to be weakened by such meetings. Lastly, 
none of the interactions between other meeting topics and firm performance is statistically 
significant.  
 Board size tends to have a positive effect on CEO compensation, as do the existence of a 
major shareholder and firm size, which is consistent with Cao et al. (2011). The firms with 
state-controlled shareholders and higher levels of debt have lower levels of CEO 
compensation. 
 In the executive pay-setting process, companies probably employ several key firm 
characteristics to select benchmarks for peer-group comparisons in the US market (Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Nguyen, 2011; Coles, Wang, and Li, 2018). Thus, we further construct another 
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proxy for excess compensation, Excess Compensation, which is obtained using the residual from 
the regression of CEO compensation on other firm characteristics (size, performance, board size, 
board independence and ownership concentration) within the same industry and year.6 Table 6B 
displays the results of the regression of Excess Compensation on board meetings and meeting-
performance interactions. The main results are consistent with others using industry-adjusted 
compensation.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6B about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Overall, the results signify that more meetings discussing firms’ mergers and acquisitions 
and the use of IPO proceeds would improve the relationship between compensation and firm 
performance. In contrast, board nomination meetings weaken this relationship. 
 
5.3 The Impact of Topic-Specific Board Meetings and Corporate Ownership in China 
 
 Chinese listed firms often have controlling shareholders who can nominate/appoint their 
preferred agents to the boards and use their power to benefit themselves, sometimes at the 
expense of the minority shareholders. The real control power of the firm often lies with either 
the state or non-state controlling shareholders, who often have different goals from other 
6 To obtain Excess Compensation, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions for each industry 
classification within the fiscal year from 2005 to 2015: Compensation jt = Log(firm size) jt+ ROA jt +Board 
size jt + Independent director % jt + Ownership Concentration jt + εjt.. The firm-specific annual excess 
compensation for firm j (in a given industry) in year t, εjt, is the residual of the regression of the above equation 
for that particular industry. 
 
 
 
27 
                                                 
shareholders that may have a huge impact on management motivations and actions. State 
owners such as SOEs or government agents have political, social, and economic goals (Allen 
et al., 2005). Non-state controlling owners have strong incentives to maximize firm value for 
their own interests, but they may also expropriate the income and assets of the listed firm 
away from the minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-SIlanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1998). This differs from governance mechanisms in the US. We focus our examinations of 
nomination and growth-strategy meetings on two subsamples: the state-controlled and non-
state-controlled firms respectively.  
 The state-controlled firm subsample contains firms with state controlling shareholders, 
while the non-state-controlled firm subsample consists of firms with non-state controlling 
shareholders. Panel A of Table 7 presents estimation results for the effects of nomination 
meetings in the state-controlled and non-state-controlled firms respectively. For the CEO 
dismissal estimations, the interaction term ROA t-1  × Nomination meeting frequency t-1  is 
only significant in the non-state-controlled firm subsample. The sign of the interaction term 
in this subsample is positive (Column (1)-B), which contradicts the negative sign of the ROA 
effect on CEO dismissal. Thus, board meetings on nominations deteriorate the sensitivity of 
CEO dismissal to performance in non-state-controlled firms.  
 For the CEO compensation estimation, the sign of the interaction term in the subsample of 
non-state-controlled firms is negative (Column (2)-B in Table 7 Panel A). This implies that 
nomination-related board meetings also deteriorate the relationship between CEO 
compensation and performance in non-state-controlled firms. In contrast, the coefficients of 
the interaction terms in the subsample of state-controlled firms are not significant (Column 
(2)-A in Table 7 Panel A). Therefore, we find that nomination-related meetings lessen the 
quality of corporate governance in non-state-controlled firms, rather than in state-controlled 
firms. These findings suggest that, in privately controlled corporations, CEOs may have more 
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power and may tend to appoint people who will conflict with them less, whereas CEOs in 
state-controlled firms may be less likely to manipulate personnel selection so as to entrench 
themselves through board meetings. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Panel B of Table 7 shows estimation results for the effects of growth-strategy meetings in 
the state-controlled firms and non-state-controlled firms respectively. In both subsamples, the 
interaction terms ROA × Growth strategies meetings are significantly and positively related to 
CEO compensation, and these signs are the same as those for firm performance (Column (2)-
A and Column (2)-B in in Table 7 Panel B). This suggests that growth-strategy meetings 
enhance the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance, regardless of ownership 
structure. Overall, we find that a higher frequency of meetings on growth strategies enhances 
quality of corporate governance in terms of improving the CEO compensation-performance 
sensitivity.   
 
5.4 Endogeneity Problem and Persistence  
We use the GMM method to reduce endogeneity concerns regarding board meetings, CEO 
dismissal/compensation and performance. These endogeneity concerns include unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic relation between board meetings and past firm 
performance concerns. Our endogenous variables are topic-specific board meetings, firm 
performance and their interaction terms. 
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However, topic-specific meetings should be treated as endogenous in the compensation 
model, based on the results of the ‘difference-in-Sargan-statistic’ test. Following recent 
works (Conyon and He, 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012), we use the dynamic GMM method to 
estimate the compensation-performance model. Topic-specific meetings, performance and 
their interactions and all of the control variables except for the year dummies are assumed to 
be potentially endogenous. One year lagged compensation is included in the main regression. 
In GMM estimation, variable dated ≤  t-2 can be used as instruments for endogenous 
variables (Arellano and Bond, 1991). We used up to five years of lagged dependent and 
endogenous variables as instruments. Heteroskedasticity is controlled by robust standard 
errors. The results are reported in Appendix C. To ensure that the dynamic GMM method is 
correctly specified, we examine the exogeneity of the instrumental variables and the 
autocorrelation conditions of the transient errors. As reported in Table 8, the Hansen over-
identification test fails to reject the null that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
terms, that is, unrelated to compensation. In addition, the residuals are significantly correlated 
in the first differences (AR(1)), but are uncorrelated in the second differences (AR(2)), 
suggesting that the assumptions of the dynamic GMM model hold. Thus, our instruments are 
valid for reducing the simultaneous causality concerns. 
 Appendix C demonstrates that Compensation is significantly related to ROA. The 
interaction term between nomination meetings and ROA (Column (1) of Table 8) is still 
negatively significant, while the interaction term between growth-strategy meetings and ROA 
is positive (Column (6) of Table 8). The GMM estimates are similar to our earlier findings. 
 
5.5 Additional Checks 
 
 5.5.1 Alternative measures of CEO dismissal and compensation. Our CEO dismissal 
measure is based on available public information (on forced or unforced dismissals). 
However, using public information to classify CEO dismissals may be problematic. 
Following previous research (e.g., Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006b), we 
employ a binary variable that equals one for any type of CEO personnel change, regardless of 
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the reason for the dismissal. We re-estimate the logit equation (1) using this new definition of 
CEO dismissal as the dependent variable. Our results are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained using forced CEO dismissal. 
 We also use the individual-level CEO payment data available from the year 2005 as a 
robustness check. Approximately 40% of CEOs did not receive any compensation from the 
listed firms during the period in question. These CEOs are likely to have received their 
salaries from the parent company, or to have held a large proportion of shares. The sample 
includes 3,454 listed-firm-year observations over the period of 2005-2010. The untabulated 
results based on the individual data are similar to those based on aggregate compensation. 
The coefficient on the interaction term (nomination meeting frequency ×  ROA) is 
significantly negative, which suggests that the link between executive compensation and a 
firm’s accounting performance is likely to be weakened by such meetings. Unreported results 
for ROE and the profit margin are similar to those for ROA. 
 Furthermore, considering the influence of the compensation paid to peers in the same 
industry, we use relative aggregate executive compensation as the payment measure. We 
calculate the relative aggregate executive compensation by subtracting the industrial median 
of the average compensation of the three highest executives in firms within the same industry 
and year. Our results are similar when we perform this robustness check. 
 
 5.5.2 Eleven meeting topics recorded in the CSMAR database. In order to test whether our 
results are affected by our grouping of meeting topics, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) 
using meeting frequencies for eleven topics recorded in the CSMAR database (see Column 2 
of Table 1). Except for meetings on nominations, the interactions are found not to be 
significant for CEO dismissal and performance sensitivity. Regarding the CEO compensation 
sensitivity to firm performance, the interactions between meetings on mergers and 
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acquisitions (6) and on the use of IPO proceeds (9) and firm performance are positively 
significant, while the other interactions are not significant. Meetings on mergers and 
acquisitions (6) and the use of IPO proceeds (9) were combined into meetings on growth 
strategies in the main analysis. Therefore, the unreported results for the eleven meeting topics 
are consistent with our main analysis based on the six major topics. 
 
 5.5.3 China-specific control variables. As our study is based on Chinese listed firms, we 
further add more control variables so as to consider the special institutional and economic 
environment in China. Stemming from the introduction of the US board system to China in 
the year 2001, the supervisory board of directors still exists there. Thus, we add the size of 
the supervisory board to control for the potential effect of monitoring from supervisors. 
Regarding the regional imbalances in economic growth, we add the Chinese government 
transparency index (or regional dummies) accordingly. Our key results remain unaltered after 
we consider characteristics of the Chinese market. 
   
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a better understanding of how board activity affects 
board effectiveness in linking CEO compensation/dismissal to firm performance. In our 
empirical examination, to measure board activity, we move beyond the mere frequency of 
board meetings and target their agendas. We exploit a unique dataset on board meeting 
agendas of Chinese listed firms over the period 2005-2015, and show that there are six major 
meeting topics, namely management and directors’ nominations, their compensation, 
management routines, firm control transactions, changes in equity structure, and growth 
strategies.  
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 To provide evidence of board effectiveness in China, we examine the influences of topic-
specific meetings on the relationship between CEO-dismissal and performance, and on that 
between CEO-compensation and performance. The rationale behind this is that discussing 
certain topics could enhance the informativeness of the board, thus helping directors to assess 
and monitor CEOs, and thereby strengthen these relationships (in other words, improve 
internal corporate governance). 
 Our results reveal that CEO dismissal is significantly negatively, and compensation 
positively, correlated to all of the accounting-based performance measures. Hence, a firm’s 
profitability is the main criterion used to evaluate the CEO’s performance in China. We also 
find that the frequencies of meetings on major topics are diverse, as are the roles of such 
meetings in monitoring the top management. In particular, the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to performance is stronger when there are more board meetings on growth 
strategies, such as mergers and acquisitions and applying IPO proceeds. When directors 
discuss firm growth strategies, they could obtain comprehensive information about firm 
performance, CEO capability, and future strategies. Our results suggest the soft information 
captured in board meetings is likely to influence directors’ evaluations of the CEO’s 
capability, leading them to change the CEO’s compensation scheme accordingly, so as to 
motivate the CEO and other managers. Meanwhile, most of the major topics of board 
meetings are not likely to affect the sensitivity between CEO turnover and performance. In 
fact, meetings on nominations could even reduce both turnover-performance and pay-
performance sensitivity.  
 In China, the majority of listed firms have dominant state shareholders or non-state 
shareholders. These two types of shareholders have distinct goals, which may influence 
managerial incentives, and selection and activities of board members. Using subsample 
analyses, we find that board meetings on growth strategies could enhance CEO 
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compensation-performance sensitivity in both types of firms. However, meetings on 
nominations reduce both turnover-performance and pay-performance sensitivity in firms 
controlled by dominant non-state shareholders. 
 The findings of our study suggest there are differences in the effects of assorted meeting 
topics on the CEO pay/dismissal-to-performance sensitivities, and highlight the need for 
more tailored approaches to board requirements. In the countries that carry out good 
‘corporate governance guidance’ policies, regulators’ agendas stay concentrated on board 
composition and structure, and the total number of annual meetings, as the means to allow 
boards to best perform their duties. A sound board structure following such guidance alone, 
however, does not ‘make great boards great’ (Sonnenfeld, 2002). To a certain degree, our 
study reflects the complexities involved in the board decision-making process. Thus, it calls 
for a reconsideration of the current one-size-fits-all approach taken by the regulators. 
Particularly in China, the regulators should consider introducing regulations to prevent 
potentially self-interested behaviour from the CEO and non-state controlling shareholders, in 
terms of making nominations and personnel changes to the directors and top management. 
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TABLE 1 Specific topics of board meetings in Chinese public firms 
This table reports the specific major topics discussed in the board meetings of Chinese listed firms. The eleven categories (by CSMAR code) of meetings are 
based on the Code of Corporate Governance in China (2001). We combine some topics as they have similar effects. 
 
  
CSMAR code  
(According to CSRC requirements) 
Major topics  Notes 
Personnel – 1 Nomination (A)  Director and officer selection, appointment, and turnover 
Compensation - 2 Compensation (B)  Emolument of directors and executives 
Financial report and pay out policies - 3 
Audit - 7 
Financial reports and audit (C)  Approval of financial reports, profit distribution, 
amendments and supplements of reports, etc.; switches 
of auditors, audit opinion; accounting treatment and 
information disclosure 
Related-party transactions - 4 
Loans Guarantees - 5 
Disposal of assets - 10 
Corporate control transactions 
(D) 
 Loan guarantees are promises by the listed firm (the 
guarantor) to assume the debt obligation of a borrower if 
that borrower defaults; disposal of assets means the gain 
or loss calculated as the net disposal proceeds, minus the 
asset’s carrying value.  
Ownership changes - 8 
Split share structure reform – 11 
 
Change of equity structure (E)   
 
Mergers and acquisitions - 6 
Use of IPO proceeds and financing - 9 
Growth strategies (F)   
TABLE 2 Sample distribution and descriptive statistics for six types of meetings across industries  
    (A) Nomination 
(B) 
Compensation 
(C) Financial 
reports and audit 
(D) Corporate 
control 
transactions 
(E) Change of 
equity structure 
(F) Growth 
strategies 
 Firms % Obs Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std A 37 2.05 290 0.945 1.230 0.134 0.415 0.314 0.553 1.362 1.542 0.103 0.376 0.469 1.069 
B 70 3.88 446 1.018 1.342 0.215 0.556 0.453 0.698 2.085 2.300 0.043 0.233 0.390 0.821 
C 903 50.00 8,180 0.919 1.261 0.240 0.665 0.421 0.680 1.778 1.993 0.120 0.432 0.374 0.878 
D 92 5.09 733 1.063 1.310 0.205 0.498 0.419 0.655 2.064 2.224 0.116 0.420 0.319 0.733 
E 50 2.77 343 0.819 1.130 0.289 0.799 0.399 0.593 1.956 2.609 0.102 0.424 0.359 0.778 
F 165 9.14 1,156 0.966 1.234 0.234 0.651 0.416 0.629 1.559 1.857 0.103 0.398 0.283 0.706 
G 83 4.60 716 0.997 1.326 0.187 0.483 0.297 0.581 1.647 1.888 0.073 0.335 0.228 0.619 
H 11 0.61 96 1.344 1.672 0.115 0.380 0.688 0.685 1.896 1.462 0.125 0.391 0.469 0.962 
I 62 3.43 409 0.951 1.346 0.386 0.920 0.408 0.662 1.257 1.648 0.132 0.440 0.340 0.863 
J 159 8.80 1,101 1.018 1.252 0.291 0.755 0.480 0.697 1.917 2.323 0.079 0.333 0.262 0.848 
K 24 1.33 155 0.929 1.249 0.174 0.444 0.426 0.654 1.394 1.753 0.148 0.532 0.374 0.815 
L 31 1.72 122 0.984 1.178 0.385 0.922 0.672 0.886 1.508 1.750 0.172 0.585 0.484 0.998 
M 24 1.33 115 1.261 1.481 0.365 0.753 0.626 0.789 1.896 1.739 0.026 0.208 0.835 1.249 
N 95 5.26 497 0.710 1.129 0.177 0.509 0.374 0.626 1.262 1.598 0.193 0.542 0.165 0.476 
Total 1,806 100 14,359             
The table shows the distribution of sample firms in 2005-2015 across industries based on the Guidance on the Industry Category of Listed Companies issued 
by the CSRC (2012 version). A = Agriculture, B = Mining, C = Manufacturing, D = Electricity， gas and water, E = Building and construction, F = 
Wholesale and retail trade, G = transportation and logistics, H = Accommodation and Catering Industry, I = Information technology, J = Real estate, K = 
Commerce, L = Water, environment and public facilities management, M = Culture, sports and entertainment, N = Synthesis. 
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TABLE 3 CEO dismissal, compensation and board meetings 
 
Panel A: Annual CEO dismissal rate, executive compensation and board meeting frequency 
 
Panel C: The differences of topic focused meeting frequencies between groups based on firm size 
  Small firms (S) Median firms (M) Large firms (L) Two sample mean t-test 
 Obs. = 4,738 Obs. = 4,737  Obs. = 4,882 Diff (S – M) Diff (M – L)  Diff (S – L)   Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std t statistics t statistics t statistics 
(A) Nomination 0.849 1.222 0.928 1.223 1.046 1.342  -3.165 ***  -4.474 ***   -7.515*** 
(B) Compensation 0.129 0.438 0.245 0.653 0.342 0.804  -10.199 ***   -6.472 ***  -16.092 *** 
(C) Financial reports and audit 0.423 0.683 0.413 0.657 0.424 0.667 0.747 -0.836 -0.074 
(D) Corporate control transactions 1.228 1.464 1.727 1.821 2.26 2.465  -14.700 ***  -12.025 ***   -24.868 *** 
(E) Change of equity structure 0.170 0.505 0.118 0.43 0.052 0.282 5.378 *** 8.867 ***  14.136 *** 
(F) Growth strategies 0.171 0.562 0.393 0.888 0.471 0.978  -14.537 ***  -4.092 ***  -18.376 *** 
(continued on next page) 
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Obs. 1,245 1,272 1,247 1,249 1,255 1,307 1,334 1,354 1,352 1,367 1,368 14,359 
CEO dismissal rate 0.189 0.189 0.167 0.166 0.163 0.176 0.164 0.14 0.182 0.2 0.219 0.178 
Compensation (RMB 000s) 230.904 259.874 357.544 397.479 440.288 524.065 598.143 637.598 684.047 738.408 802.093 528.059 
Annual meeting frequency 7.504 8.227 9.874 9.768 8.712 9.01 9.388 9.806 9.158 9.703 10.711 9.277 
 
Panel B: Meeting frequencies on major topics        
Observations = 14,359 Mean Median Std 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
(A) Nomination 0.942 0.000 1.267 397 450 512 695 687 1169 1223 1312 1716 2061 2305 
(B) Compensation 0.240 0.000 0.656 96 45 35 103 95 255 316 344 548 688 915 
(C) Financial reports and audit 0.420 0.000 0.669 355 296 186 147 232 369 374 643 808 1202 1418 
(D) Corporate control transactions 1.743 1.000 2.011 1381 1337 1531 1815 1834 2293 2142 2818 3138 3240 3502 
(E) Change of equity structure 0.113 0.000 0.418 180 1055 121 63 58 37 11 38 20 8 26 
(F) Growth strategies 0.346 0.000 0.840 119 106 147 209 294 303 474 466 696 817 1342 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Meeting frequencies on all eleven topics in CSMAR database 
Type of meeting Mean Median Std 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
M1 0.942 0.000 1.267  397   450   512   695   687   1,169   1,223   1,312   1,716   2,061   2,305  
M2 0.240 0.000 0.656  96   45   35   103   95   255   316   344   548   688   915  
M3 0.383 0.000 0.620  337   211   112   130   192   326   331   606   755   1,136   1,365  
M4 1.150 1.000 1.394  1,054   966   1,120   1,435   1,154   1,589   1,381   1,866   1,988   1,957   1,999  
M5 0.478 0.000 1.128  235   321   352   347   601   564   635   815   872   959   1,168  
M6 0.117 0.000 0.431  64   57   93   89   133   107   166   176   176   190   424  
M7 0.037 0.000 0.203  18   85   74   17   40   43   43   37   53   66   53  
M8 0.032 0.000 0.205  179   54   38   19   43   36   9   35   16   8   26  
M9 0.230 0.000 0.686  55   49   54   120   161   196   308   290   520   627   918  
M10 0.115 0.000 0.400  92   50   59   33   79   140   126   137   278   324   335  
M11 0.080 0.000 0.361  1   1,001   83   44   15   1   2   3   4   0 0    
This table reports the rate of CEO dismissal, the executive compensation (the average of the three highest-paid executives’ compensation), the annual number 
of board meetings, and the frequencies of board meetings on major topics, in Chinese public firms from 2005 to 2015. In panel A, the CEO dismissal rate 
refers to the percentage of CEO dismissals in the single year. Executive compensation (000s RMB) is the average compensation of the three highest-paid 
executives and directors, including basic salary, bonuses, and other benefits. Annual number of board meetings expresses the average frequency of board 
meetings. Panel B shows the frequencies of meetings on the six major topics individually: nomination (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), 
corporate control transactions (D), change of equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F). Panel C illustrates that topic-specific meeting frequencies vary 
with firm size. Firm year observations have been grouped into small firms (S-the lower third of the distribution), median firms (M-the median third) and large 
firms (L-the higher third). Panel D demonstrates the frequencies of meetings on original 11 topics in CSMAR database individually, where M1 = Personnel, 
M2 = Compensation, M3 = Financial report and pay out policies, M4 = Related-party transactions, M5 = Loans Guarantees, M6 = Disposal of assets, M7 = 
Audit, M8 = Ownership changes, M9 = Use of IPO proceeds and financing, M10 = Disposal of assets, M11 = Split share structure reform. 
.  
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TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics for main variables 
  Definition Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 N 
ROA Net profit divided by total assets 0.039 0.040 0.058 0.021 0.065 14,359 
Industry adjusted ROA The firm’ ROA minus the mean of ROA in the same industry 0.000 0.002 0.057 -0.017 0.025 14,359 
Age CEO age 51.515 51.000 6.999 47.000 56.000 12,490 
Female A dummy variable equals one if CEO is female 0.036 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.000 14,359 
Board size Logarithm of number of directors 9.194 9.000 1.928 8.000 10.000 14,246 
Duality An indicator equals one if the same person acts as CEO and chairman, and zero otherwise 0.139 0.000 0.346 0.000 0.000 13,645 
Independent directors % Fraction of independent directors on board 0.365 0.333 0.053 0.333 0.375 14,246 
Largest shareholding% Shares held by largest shareholders 31.692 29.445 17.625 17.718 44.050 13,577 
State-owned enterprises Dummy equals one if the firm is controlled by the state or government agencies, and zero otherwise 0.656 1.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 14,359 
Ownership Concentration Herfindahl_index - Sum of squares of shareholding percentage of top five shareholders 0.175 0.141 0.128 0.073 0.252 14,359 
Leverage Total liability over total assets 21.983 21.870 1.410 21.032 22.804 14,359 
Log(firm size) Log value of firm’s total assets 7.614 7.690 1.527 6.774 8.559 14,315 
Log(employees) Logarithm of number of employees in the firm 0.039 0.040 0.058 0.021 0.065 14,359 
Industry adjusted compensation The firm’s compensation minus the average of compensation in the same industry based on CSRC industry code in the fiscal year 0.000 0.015 0.747 -0.463 0.463 14,294 
Excess Compensation 
The residual from the regression of CEO compensation on more 
firm characteristics (e.g. size, performance) within the same 
industry and year (see details in Footnote 7) 
0.000 0.0270 0.668 -0.415 0.418 14,140 
The table provides definitions and descriptive statistics for the main variables. The sample contains firm-years from 2005 to 2015.  
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TABEL 5 The effects of meetings on the six major topics on the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to firm performance 
CEO dismissal (A) Nomination (B) Compensation (C) Financial reports 
and audit 
(D) Corporate control 
transactions 
(E) Change of equity 
structure 
(F) Growth strategies 
 Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
ROA t-1 -3.277*** -3.419*** -2.400*** -2.301*** -2.408*** -2.410*** -2.133*** -2.426*** -2.603*** -2.655*** -2.694*** -2.735*** 
 (0.709) (0.712) (0.621) (0.626) (0.679) (0.667) (0.763) (0.704) (0.617) (0.615) (0.627) (0.636) 
Topic-focused  -0.180*** -0.291*** -0.174*** -0.327*** 0.097* 0.164* -0.005 -0.011 0.044 -0.053 -0.138*** -0.269*** 
meeting t-1 (0.029) (0.065) (0.067) (0.103) (0.056) (0.085) (0.018) (0.066) (0.076) (0.128) (0.050) (0.086) 
ROAt-1 × topic- 0.649* 2.364** -0.894 -1.974 -0.253 -0.504 -0.259 -0.312 0.631 2.260 0.765 1.244 
Focused meeting 
t-1 
(0.388) (1.096) (1.398) (1.869) (0.676) (1.306) (0.309) (1.115) (1.294) (2.345) (0.998) (1.576) 
Age t-1 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Female t-1 -0.452** -0.431** -0.452** -0.450** -0.430** -0.431** -0.438** -0.439** -0.438** -0.435** -0.427** -0.426** 
 (0.208) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Board size t-1 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.026 -0.027 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Duality t-1 -0.327** -0.342** -0.346** -0.345** -0.361** -0.360** -0.347** -0.350** -0.351** -0.349** -0.345** -0.349** 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) 
Independent  1.186 1.184 1.144 1.156 1.099 1.108 1.089 1.089 1.077 1.079 1.116 1.104 
directors % t-1 (0.840) (0.839) (0.835) (0.835) (0.835) (0.835) (0.834) (0.834) (0.835) (0.834) (0.835) (0.835) 
Largest  -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
shareholding% t-1 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
State-owned  0.153 0.152 0.152 0.155 0.165 0.163 0.164 0.163 0.161 0.163 0.147 0.148 
enterprises t-1 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
Ownership  -0.618 -0.636 -0.743 -0.706 -0.706 -0.723 -0.688 -0.700 -0.690 -0.711 -0.814 -0.800 
Concentration t-1 (0.662) (0.660) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.661) (0.660) 
Log(employees) t-1 -0.021 -0.021 -0.015 -0.015 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Log(firm size) t-1 -0.171** -0.172** -0.166** -0.167** -0.176** -0.175** -0.174** -0.177** -0.176** -0.173** -0.155** -0.157** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) 
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Leverage t-1 0.348* 0.373* 0.320 0.315 0.347* 0.346* 0.338* 0.338* 0.334* 0.333* 0.286 0.282 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year&Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald  χ2 266.436 253.032 233.729 237.701 229.431 230.207 226.866 226.207 226.685 227.218 234.922 237.079 
Firm-years 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8174 8,174 8,174 8,174 8,174 
This table presents series of logistic regressions with fixed effects. CEO dismissal is the dependent variable, which equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and 
zero otherwise over the period 2005-2015. ROA is an industry-adjusted ROA. Nominations (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), firm 
control transactions (D), changes of equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the major topics discussed. Topic-specific meetings are defined as (1) is 
the annual meeting frequency for each topic and (2) a dummy variable indicating whether the annual meeting frequency above the median for distribution 
within the same year for each topic from Column (A) to (F). The interaction terms between firm performance and topic-focused meeting frequency capture 
the meetings’ moderate effects on the relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 4. *p < .10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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TABEL 6A The effects of meetings on the six major topics on the sensitivity of industry adjusted compensation to firm performance  
Industry adjusted 
Compensation 
(A) Nomination (B) Compensation (C) Financial reports 
and audit 
(D) Corporate control 
transactions 
(E) Change of equity 
structure 
(F) Growth strategies 
 Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
Number 
(1) 
Dummy 
(2) 
ROA t-1 1.195*** 1.201*** 1.076*** 1.058*** 1.171*** 1.172*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.027*** 1.046*** 0.987*** 0.995*** 
 (0.139) (0.141) (0.124) (0.126) (0.136) (0.133) (0.150) (0.139) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) (0.084) 
Topic-focused  0.008** 0.015* 0.040*** 0.056*** 0.010 -0.017 0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.016 0.007 0.015 
Meeting t-1 (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.007) (0.010) 
ROAt-1 × topic- -0.140** -0.391** -0.280 -0.136 -0.263 -0.523 0.034 0.156 0.208 0.075 0.309*** 0.399** 
focused-meeting t-1 (0.068) (0.175) (0.192) (0.271) (0.145) (0.336) (0.054) (0.195) (0.258) (0.430) (0.119) (0.193) 
Board size t-1 0.010* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Duality t-1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) 
Independent  0.241 0.242 0.247 0.247 0.242 0.241 0.243 0.242 0.243 0.244 0.244 0.243** 
directors % t-1 (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.105) 
Largest  0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 
shareholding% t-1 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State-owned  -0.091** -0.091** -0.088** -0.089** -0.090** -0.091** -0.091** -0.092** -0.091** -0.091** -0.090** -0.090*** 
enterprises t-1 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.019) 
Ownership  -0.044 -0.041 -0.022 -0.029 -0.038 -0.037 -0.041 -0.041 -0.039 -0.037 -0.031 -0.031 
Concentration t-1 (0.170) (0.170) (0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.085) 
Log(employees) t-1 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) 
Log(firm size) t-1 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) 
Leverage t-1 -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.198*** -0.198*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.024) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.109 0.109 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 
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Firm-years 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 11,874 
This table reports results from panel data regressions with fixed effects over the period 2005-2015. Compensation is the industry adjusted compensation. 
ROA is an industry-adjusted measure of ROA. Nominations (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), firm control transactions (D), changes of 
equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the major topics discussed. Topic-focused meeting are define as (1) is the annual meeting frequency for each 
topic and (2) whether the annual meeting frequency above the median for distribution within the same year for each topic. Interaction terms between firm 
performance and the topic-focused meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderating effects on the relationship between compensation and firm 
performance. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 4. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
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TABEL 6B The effects of meetings on the six major topics on the sensitivity of excess compensation 
to firm performance  
Excess  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Compensation Nomination Compensation Financial 
reports 
and audit 
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change 
of equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
ROA t-1 0.760*** 0.621*** 0.672*** 0.655*** 0.558*** 0.561*** 
 (0.147) (0.129) (0.137) (0.155) (0.125) (0.086) 
Topic-focused  0.016*** 0.034*** 0.011 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
meetingt-1 (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.016) (0.007) 
ROAt-1 × topic-
focused  
-0.155** -0.247 -0.161 -0.037 0.353 0.188* 
meeting t-1 (0.075) (0.211) (0.130) (0.060) (0.245) (0.113) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.245 0.245 0.244 0.244 0.244 0.244 
Firm-years 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 
This table reports results from panel data regressions with fixed effects. Excess Compensation is 
obtained by using the residual from the regression of CEO compensation on more firm characteristics 
(size, performance, board size, board independence and ownership concentration) within the same 
industry and year (details in Footnote 7). Firm performance is an industry-adjusted ROA. 
Nominations (A), compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), firm control transactions (D), 
changes of equity structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the major topics discussed. Topic-
focused meeting is the frequency of annual meetings for each topic. Interaction terms between firm 
performance and the topic-focused meeting capture the meetings’ moderating effects on the 
relationship between compensation and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided in 
Table 4. Models are estimated over the period 2005-2015. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
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TABEL 7 The effects of meeting frequencies on nomination and growth strategy under different 
ownership structure. 
 
Panel A: The Effects of Nomination Meeting Frequency under Different Ownership Structure. 
 (1) CEO dismissal (2) Compensation  
 A. State 
controlled firms 
B.  Non-state-
controlled firms 
A. State 
controlled firms 
B.  Non-state-
controlled firms 
ROA t-1 -2.901*** -4.338*** 1.482*** 0.737*** 
 (0.912) (0.912) (0.119) (0.152) 
Nomination meeting  -0.151*** -0.061 0.005 0.020*** 
frequency t-1 (0.033) (0.042) (0.005) (0.006) 
ROA t-1  × Nomination  0.530 0.910* -0.038 -0.191** 
meeting frequency t-1 (0.524) (0.509) (0.064) (0.080) 
Control variables t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald  χ2 217.759 139.543   
Adj. R2   0.110 0.142 
Firm-years 5,844 4,155 7,728 4,146 
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Panel A of this table reports panel data regression (with firm fixed effects) results of models linking 
the interaction terms of nomination meeting frequencies with firm performance to CEO dismissal and 
compensation from 2005 to 2015. CEO dismissal is the dependent variable, which equals one if the 
CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise. ROA is an industry-adjusted measure of ROA. Nomination 
meeting frequency is the number of annual meetings on nomination. Interaction terms between ROA 
and the nomination meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderating effects on the relationship 
between CEO dismissal/compensation and firm performance. Panel B of this table shows panel data 
regression (with firm fixed effects) results of models linking the interaction terms of meeting 
frequency on growth strategies with firm performance to compensation.  Compensation is the industry 
adjusted compensation. Meeting frequency of growth strategies is the number of annual meetings on 
growth strategies. Interaction term between ROA and the meeting frequency of growth strategies 
captures the meetings’ moderating effects on the relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 4. The state controlled firms contain 
firms with state controlling shareholders, while non-state-controlled firms consists of firms with non-
state controlled shareholders. 
 
  
Panel B: The Effects of Meeting Frequency on Growth Strategies under Different Ownership Structure. 
 (2) Compensation  
 A. State controlled firms B. Non-State controlled firms 
ROA t-1 1.356*** 0.484*** 
 (0.107) (0.136) 
Growth strategies  -0.009 0.012 
meetings t-1 (0.009) (0.012) 
ROA t-1 × Growth 0.311** 0.455** 
strategies meetings t-1 (0.141) (0.182) 
Control variables t-1 Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.497 0.530 
Firm-years 7,728 4,146 
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 Appendix A 
An Examples of Independent Director’ Reports. Compensation (2) and Loan Guarantees (5) were 
discussed on 27 April 2007 in board meeting of Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Co., Ltd 
(WHZS, 000785). 
Stock trading code: 000785 (SHE) 
Company name: Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Co., Ltd (WHZS) 
Announcement date: 27 April 2007 
Independent directors: Tan, Liwen; Li, Yanping; Xie, Huobao 
Topic code: 2-Compensation; 5- Loan Guarantees  
Opinion type: unqualified opinion 
Content:  
Pursuant to the “Guiding Opinions on Establishing Independent Directors in Listed Companies”, 
“Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listing Rules”, “Articles of Association”, and other related regulations, 
we would like to issue the following opinion on WHZS’s following two following issues passed at the 
fourth meeting of the sixth session of the board of directors: 
 
First, to our best knowledge, we agree that compensations of directors and senior management in 
2006 have meet the plan requirements-" the implementation plan of company directors and senior 
management compensation in 2006" approved by the annual General Meeting (2005). 
 
Second, based on the annual report 2006 of WHZS, the audit report 2006 (2007-421), and the 
“Special statement of controlling shareholders and other related parties possessing fund of the listed 
firm”(2007-148) provided by Wuhan Zhonghuan Accounting Firms, we have carefully examined the 
incurred and accumulative amount of loan guarantees, we believe the loan guarantees for subsidiary 
companies in 2006 was 160 million RMB, accumulated to 260 million. No other loan guarantees for 
related parties happened in 2006.  
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Appendix B 
Correlation of Main Variables.  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 CEO dismissal 1                    
2 Compensation -0.07** 1                   
3 Nomination 0.23** 0.10** 1                  
4 Compensation 0 0.22** 0.21** 1                 
5 Financial reports and audit 0.03** 0.05** 0.27** 0.22** 1                
6 Corporate control transactions 0.04** 0.15** 0.21** 0.14** 0.23** 1               
7 Change of equity structure 0.01 -0.15** -0.08** -0.06** -0.04** -0.06** 1              
8 Growth strategies -0.01 0.14** 0.16** 0.20** 0.19** 0.21** -0.06** 1             
9 ROA -0.08** 0.25** -0.06** 0.05** -0.10** -0.01 0 -0.01 1            
10 Age -0.13** 0.24** -0.02+ 0.07** 0 0.02* -0.05** 0.05** 0.10** 1           
11 Female 0 0.01 0 0 -0.02** -0.02* 0.01 0 0.01 -0.03** 1          
12 Board size -0.04** 0.11** 0 -0.01 -0.09** 0.02* 0.03** -0.02+ 0.05** 0.06** -0.01+ 1         
13 Duality 0.01 -0.02+ 0.01 0.05** 0.08** -0.03** 0 0.03** -0.03** -0.01 -0.01+ -0.12** 1        
14 Independent directors % 0.02** 0.07** 0.03** 0.06** 0.06** 0.03** -0.06** 0.07** -0.02** 0.02** -0.02* -0.32** 0.05** 1       
15 Largest shareholding% 0.02* 0.08** 0 -0.01 -0.07** 0.02+ -0.03** 0.01 0.10** 0.09** -0.01 0.06** -0.12** 0.06** 1      
16 State-owned enterprises 0.05** 0 -0.04** -0.13** -0.11** 0.02** 0.01 -0.08** -0.02* 0.06** -0.03** 0.20** -0.17** -0.05** 0.39** 1     
17 Ownership Concentration 0.02+ 0.07** 0 -0.02** -0.08** 0.04** -0.02* -0.02* 0.13** 0.07** -0.01 0.08** -0.12** 0.03** 0.76** 0.24** 1    
18 Log(employees) -0.05** 0.31** 0 0.08** -0.05** 0.13** -0.05** 0.09** 0.13** 0.20** -0.04** 0.26** -0.07** 0.02** 0.22** 0.24** 0.25** 1   
19 Log(firm size) -0.04** 0.54** 0.05** 0.13** -0.02** 0.20** -0.11** 0.12** 0.17** 0.24** -0.02** 0.25** -0.10** 0.10** 0.34** 0.23** 0.35** 0.68** 1  
20 Leverage 0.05** -0.09** 0 -0.04** 0.02* 0.08** 0.01 -0.07** -0.18** -0.09** 0 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.05** -0.02* -0.04** -0.01 0.04** 1 
CEO dismissal is a dichotomous variable, which equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise. Compensation is equal to the nature logarithm of the 
average of the three highest-paid executives’ compensation. Other variables are lagged values. Meetings definitions are provided in Table 1, and other 
independent variable definitions are shown in Table 2. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Appendix C 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis on the Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics on the sensitivity 
of CEO compensation to firm Performance.  
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 
Nomination Compensation 
Financial 
reports and 
audit 
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change of 
equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
Compensation t-1 0.352*** 0.259*** 0.153* 0.344*** 0.259*** 0.256*** 
 (0.049) (0.071) (0.081) (0.104) (0.052) (0.075) 
ROA t 0.709*** 1.022** 1.556*** 1.913** 0.704* 0.083 
 (0.157) (0.462) (0.596) (0.748) (0.402) (0.457) 
Topic-focused  0.011** -0.019 0.031 0.003 -0.191** 0.256*** 
meeting t (0.005) (0.049) (0.038) (0.019) (0.077) (0.037) 
ROAt × topic- -0.188*** -0.130 -0.531 0.302 1.282 1.268** 
focused-meetings t (0.070) (0.510) (0.387) (0.245) (1.030) (0.580) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 9,774 9,774 9,774 9,774 9,774 9,774 
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) p-value 0.13 0.13 0.61 0.07 0.09 0.30 
Over-identification 
test p-value 
0.13 0.11 0.152 0.26 0.26 0.21 
The table reports the regression results with dynamic GMM estimator. Compensation is the industry 
adjusted compensation. ROA is an industry-adjusted measure of ROA. Nominations (A), 
compensation (B), financial reports and audit (C), firm control transactions (D), changes of equity 
structure (E) and growth strategies (F) are the major topics discussed. Topic-focused meeting 
frequency is the frequency of annual meetings on each topic. Interaction terms between firm 
performance and the topic-focused meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderating effects on the 
relationship between compensation and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided in 
Table 3. Models are estimated over the period 2005-2015. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
 
 
